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Abstract. In this report, we are concerned with models to analyze the security of cryptographic algorithms against side-channel attacks. Our objectives are threefold. In a first part of the paper, we aim to survey a number of well known intuitions related to physical security and to connect them with more formal results in this area. For this purpose, we study the definition of leakage function introduced by Micali and Reyzin in 2004 and its relation to practical power consumption traces. Then, we discuss the non equivalence between the unpredictability and indistinguishability of pseudorandom generators in physically observable cryptography. Eventually, we examine the assumption of bounded leakage per iteration that has been used recently to prove the security of different constructions against side-channel attacks. We show that approximated leakage bounds can be obtained using the framework for the analysis of side-channel key recovery attacks published at Eurocrypt 2009.
In a second part of the paper, we aim to investigate two recent leakage resilient pseudorandom generators, both from a theoretical and practical point of view. On the one hand, we consider a forward secure generator from ASIACCS 2008 and its similarities with a previous construction by Bellare and Yee. On the other hand, we analyze Pietrzak's block cipher based construction from Eurocrypt 2009. Doing this, we put forward the difficulty of meaningfully restricting the physical leakages and show that this difficulty leads to different drawbacks. This allows us to emphasize the differences between these two designs. First, one construction that we analyze requires strong black box assumptions (i.e. random oracles) -the other one considers unrealistic leakages leading to (possibly useless) performance overheads. Second, one construction considers an adversary able to adaptively choose a leakage function while the second one does not permit this adaptivity. Third, the security proof of the Eurocrypt 2009 construction relies on the assumption that "only computation leaks" (or relaxed but related hypotheses) while this assumption is not necessary for the ASIACCS construction. We then discuss the impact of these hypotheses with respect to recent technological advances.
Introduction
Theoretical treatments of physical attacks have recently attracted the attention of the cryptographic community, as witnessed by various publications, e.g. [1, 14, 19, 20, 25, 27, 29, 30, 37] . These works consider adversaries enhanced with abilities such as inserting faults during a computation or monitoring side-channel leakages. They generally aim to move from the ad hoc analysis of the attacks towards stronger and more systematic security arguments or proofs. Quite naturally, these more general approaches also have limitations that are mainly caused by the versatility of physical phenomenons. Namely, since it is impossible to prove the security against an all powerful physical adversary, one has to find ways to meaningfully restrict them. This is in fact similar to the situation in classical cryptography, where we need to rely on computational assumptions. That is, when moving to a physical setting, we need to determine what are the physical limits of the adversary. Therefore, the question arises of how relevant these physical models are and to which extent they capture the engineering experience. In order to tackle this question, it is useful to first introduce some usual terminology, e.g. from the side-channel cryptanalysis lounge [12] :
1. Invasive vs. non-invasive attacks. Invasive attacks require depackaging the chip to get direct access to its inside components. A typical example of this is the connection of a wire on a data bus to see the data transfers. A non-invasive attack only exploits externally available information (the emission of which is however often unintentional) such as running time, power consumption, . . .
One can go further along this axis by distinguishing local and distant attacks: a local attack requires close but external (i.e. non-invasive) proximity to the device under concern, for example by a direct connection to its power supply. As opposed, a distant attack can operate at a larger distance, for example by measuring an electromagnetic field several meters (or hundreds of meters) away, or by interacting with the device through an internet connection. probing attacks (passive, invasive) memory attacks (passive, non-invasive) A learns (noisy) bits A inserts faults on the bits A learns (noisy) functions of the bits 2. Active vs. passive attacks. Active attacks try to tamper with the devices proper functioning. For example, fault induction attacks will try to introduce errors in the computation. By contrast, passive attacks will simply observe the devices behavior during its processing, without disturbing it.
As an illustration, Figure 1 classifies different physical attacks according to these two axes. With this respect, it is important to remark that seemingly similar abilities can have very different costs in practice. For example, probing attacks such as described by Anderson and Kuhn [3] and the recent memory attacks based on data remanence issues [17] both allow the adversary to learn the value of certain bits in a cryptographic device. But the first one can only target depackaged chips and may require very expensive tools to probe circuits, e.g. when realized in advanced (65 nanometer or smaller) technologies. By contrast, memory remanence based attacks can take advantage of cheap "cold boot" techniques to read memory. In addition, the cost of an attack is not the only factor to consider when discussing its applicability. The likelihood to find its scenario in real life conditions is obviously as important. As a result, side-channel attacks are usually considered as the most dangerous type of physical attacks. They are at the same time low cost and realistic, e.g. when applied against small embedded devices as in the Keeloq case study presented at Crypto 2008 [11] .
In this report, we consequently investigate the relation between theoretical models and practical engineering works in the area of side-channel attacks. In particular, we consider the pseudorandom generators (PRG) proposed at ASI-ACCS 2008 [29] and Eurocrypt 2009 [30] , respectively. These constructions are based on the same core ideas. First, they assume a bounded leakage for each iteration of the PRG. Second, they rely on frequent key updates in order to avoid the application of standard DPA attacks. In fact, these ideas were not new. Directly after the publication of the first power analysis attack [22] , Paul Kocher listed possible countermeasure in which key updates combined with bounded leakage were explicitly mentioned [23, 24] . Hence, the novelty in the previous PRGs is not really in the design principles but rather in the advanced techniques for their analysis, leading to a better confidence in their security levels.
Both papers have pros and cons. Summarizing, the ASIACCS PRG was the first one to provide a systematic analysis of a block cipher based construction in a physically observable setting. It initiated a study of forward secure cryptographic primitives with their relation to side-channel issues. The underlying model in this work [37] is a specialization of Micali and Reyzin [27] and is motivated by the need to evaluate side-channel attacks on a fair basis. As will be shown in Section 5.3 of this report, this connection to the practice of side-channel attacks is required anyway, anytime a leakage bound needs to be assumed (and hence, quantified). In other words, the framework presented at Eurocrypt 2009 [37] also applies to the work of Pietrzak [30] and more generally to any construction based on a λ-bit leakage: it can be used to determine practical values for λ. On the negative side, the analysis in [29] considers black box security and physical security separately. It also relies on the existence of ideal ciphers.
The main advantage of [30] is to analyze the security of a PRG in a combined fashion, mixing black box and physical security issues, and in the standard model. It also introduces useful tools for the systematic investigation of physically observable devices (e.g. the quantification of the leakages with the HILL pseudoentropy). Interestingly, a part of these tools can be used to generalize the analysis of [29] , e.g. allowing the combined analysis of its physical and black box security in the random oracle model (as we propose in this paper). On the negative side, the PRG of Eurocrypt 2009 lacks a secure initialization process (as discussed in Section 6.1). It is also designed in order to face unrealistic (i.e. too powerful) leakages, e.g. the so called "future computation attacks" that we describe in Section 5.1. As a result, it exploits a (less efficient) "alternating structure" for which it is not clear if it is really required to prevent actual side-channel attacks or if it is only caused by proof technicalities. Eventually, its security proofs rely on the assumption that "only computation leaks" (or relaxed but related assumptions) which may not always be respected in practice.
Following these observations, the goal of this report is threefold.
First, we aim to connect Micali and Reyzin's definition of leakage function to the practice of side-channel attacks. Doing so, we also review the intuitions behind some important results, e.g. the non equivalence between the unpredictability and indistinguishability of pseudorandom generators when implemented in leaking devices. Second, we aim to investigate the underlying assumptions and the concrete security provided by the two aforementioned PRGs in a systematic manner. Doing so, we introduce definitions allowing us to formalize the practical security of an implementation, inspired by the q-limited adversaries used in Vaudenay's decorrelation theory [43] . Third, we analyze the problems related to the initialization of a leakage resilient PRG with a public seed. Doing so, we put forward the incompatibility of a secure initialization with a fully adaptive selection of the leakage functions. We also emphasize that standard constructions for pseudorandom functions (PRF) [15] and pseudorandom permutations (PRP) [26] can be shown leakage resilient in the random oracle model. We conclude this paper with an impossibility result: we show that the leakage resilience of these standard constructions cannot be proven in the standard model. We let as an open problem to determine the minimum black box assumptions and restrictions of the leakage function that would be required for this purpose.
Note that this work mainly focuses on the formal techniques used to analyze two PRGs, namely [29] and [30] . Obviously, they are not the only attempts to study side-channel attacks from a more theoretical point of view. Several other references could be acknowledged, e.g. [8, 36] , typically. However, we believe these two PRGs are emblematic of one approach for proving the security against sidechannel attacks that we denote as the "global approach" in Section 4.
Background

Notations
We take advantage of notations from [34, 37] . In particular, let x R ← − X be a uniformly distributed plaintext picked up from a set X and k R ← − K be a uniformly distributed key picked up from a set K. For simplicity, we take X = K = {0, 1}
n . Let also E k (x) be the encryption of a plaintext x under a key k with a n-bit block cipher. In classical cryptanalysis, an adversary is able to query the block cipher in order to obtain pairs of the form [x i , E k (x i )]. In side-channel attacks, he is additionally provided with the output of a leakage function of which exemplary outputs are illustrated in Figure 2 . Let x q = [x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x q ] be a vector containing a sequence of q input plaintexts to a target implementation. In our notations, the measurements resulting from the observation of the encryption of these q plaintexts are stored in a leakage vector that we denote as
Each element l i of the leakage vector is referred to as a leakage trace and is in the set of leakages L. Typically, L = R N l , where N l is the number of samples per trace (possibly coming from multiple channels [39] ). For example, Figure 2 represents 4 leakage traces, corresponding to 4 input plaintexts encrypted under the same key. Eventually, we denote the t th leakage sample of a trace as l i (t).
Definition of a leakage function
Following [27] , a leakage function is an abstraction that models all the specificities of a side-channel (e.g. the power consumption or the EM radiation of a chip), up to the measurement setup used to monitor the physical observables. Using the previous notations, it means that each leakage sample l i (t) in a leakage trace l i is the output of a leakage function L t . In our block cipher example, this leakage function takes at least a plaintext x i and a secret key k as inputs. But in theory, the leakages take many more parameters into account. For this reason, Micali and Reyzin consider three input arguments, namely the target device's internal configuration C, a measurement parameter M and a random string R. Note that in order to be reflective of actual physical leakages, C has to contain all the configurations of the device before the computation corresponding to its current inputs, i.e. before the t th sample of input x i has been produced in our block cipher example. This incorporates the fact that the leakages can in principle be dependent on anything that has been computed prior to this time sample t, e.g. on the transitions between a former state and a current state in standard CMOS devices. Since Micali and Reyzin define a leakage function as a polynomial time function of its input arguments, this "history" is necessary to include forward secure primitives for which previous states are not polynomial time computable from current states. It yields:
C For convenience and in order to avoid unnecessarily heavy notations, we will omit the parameters of Equation (1) that are not directly useful for our discussions in the following of this paper (e.g. M , typically). We will also sometimes replace the generic state C by the parts of the state for which the leakage dependencies are exploited in a side-channel attack (e.g. inputs and keys).
We note that polynomial time functions actually correspond to more powerful leakages than what is usually observed in practice. As will be discussed in Section 5.1, leakage functions generally have a more limited complexity of which the exact specification is an interesting direction to obtain more efficient side-channel resistant constructions. Also, a consequence of the previous generic definition is that we potentially have a different leakage function for every implementation 1 . It implies that any security analysis that one may perform in the context of side-channel attacks has to be positioned between two extremes:
1. On the one hand, we can analyze cryptographic primitives with respect to a generic adversary who is enhanced with an arbitrary leakage function. But then, generic and positive statements are hard to obtain and prove. They are also difficult to interpret for a specific device. 2. On the other hand, we can completely fix one instance of leakage function (i.e. perform an experimental attack against a given target device). But then, the conclusions obtained are only valid within this particular setting.
Quite naturally, an interesting approach would be to investigate the existence of intermediate contexts, i.e. to restrict the leakage function in such a way that conclusions can be drawn as long as the leakages fulfill a set of practically meaningful conditions. It is typically the approach followed, e.g. by [19, 29, 30] .
Note that a concurrent solution for the analysis of physical security issues in cryptography is to rely on the existence of some minimum primitives from which it is possible to build secure devices. This is typically the "minimal one way function" of Micali and Reyzin [27] or the "tamper proof" pieces of hardware in [14, 20] . As a matter of fact, these approaches are complementary. Namely, one focuses on the construction of physically secure objects while the other focuses on their exploitation in the construction of advanced functionalities.
Unpredictability vs. indistinguishability
Although protecting leaking devices against key recovery attacks is already difficult, ensuring security against this type of attacks is unfortunately not sufficient. One generally expects pseudorandom generators, functions or permutations to be indistinguishable from truly random. For example, we can refer to the formal definitions of security for symmetric encryption schemes in [4] . As an illustration, we use the real-or-random indistinguishability. In this setting, the adversary has access to an oracle Enc k (RR(·, b)) that takes an input message x and does the following: toss a coin b, if b = 0, return Enc k (x), else return Enc k (r), where Enc k (x) is an encryption scheme (i.e. typically, our block cipher E k (x) put into a certain mode of operation) and r R ← − X is a uniformly distributed random message.
1 In [27, 37] , an implementation is defined as the combination of a target device and a measurement setup. We use the same definition in this paper.
Definition 1. Let Enc : K × X → X be an encryption scheme and A be an algorithm that has access to the oracle Enc k (RR(·, b)). We consider:
The ror-advantage of a chosen plaintext adversary A against Enc is:
We say that an encryption scheme Enc is ror-indistinguishable if this ror-advantage is negligible for any polynomial time adversary.
The central issue when trying to adapt this definition to the a physically observable device is that in general, a leakage trace easily allows distinguishing real inputs/outputs from random ones. This can be intuitively understood by looking at Figure 3 where the leakage trace corresponding to an encryption y i = Enc k (x i ) is plotted. In this trace, we see that different dependencies can be observed and exploited: the beginning of the trace mainly leaks about the input x i ; the core of the trace leaks jointly about the input x i and the secret key k; finally, the end of the trace mainly leaks about the the output y i . In most practical side-channel attacks, the leakage is in fact sufficient to recover the secret key k, provided a sufficient amount of (different) encrypted plaintexts can be observed.
time samples leakage executed operations : Say now that the adversary does not have to recover the key, but to distinguish a real output Enc k (x i ) from a random one Enc k (r), given the input x i and the leakage trace corresponding to the encryption of x i . In fact, the leakage trace will easily allow doing this distinction. For example, imagine that some samples in the leakage trace depend on the Hamming weight H W (x i ), a frequently considered model in practice. With high probability, this Hamming weight will not be equal to H W (r). In other words, since we can hardly achieve implementations secure against key recovery, it is even harder to achieve implementations providing an indistinguishability notion. At least, this is definitely not something that we can take for granted. Note that for exactly the same reasons, the existence of durable functions and maximal one way functions as assumed in [27] cannot be considered as reasonable foundations for a leakage resilient cryptography.
The previous discussion suggests that "protecting" the inputs/outputs of a cryptographic algorithm against distinguishing attacks enhanced with physical leakages is a difficult task. Following this observation, a natural idea is to try analyzing simpler security notions for simpler primitives first. For example, [19, 27, 29, 30] consider PRGs. In this context, two security definitions can be considered, namely the next bit unpredictability introduced in [6] and the current output indistinguishability introduced in [45] . In a black box setting, these two notions are equivalent. But as pointed out in [27] , this equivalence does not hold anymore with physically observable devices. The reason of this difference can be easily understood from the example in Figure 3 . Intuitively, what essentially matters from a side-channel point of view is the word "next " in these definitions. That is, distinguishing current outputs from random ones is trivial if one can access the leakage corresponding to this output (see the Hamming weight example). But predicting the next output bit may still be difficult in this case. Therefore, the following sections will consider a definition of security that corresponds to the next output indistinguishability (or equivalently to the next bit unpredictability). We denote this security notion as physical indistinguishability.
be the leakage vector corresponding to these q iterations. Let P q = (G q , L) be the physical implementation corresponding to the combination of the pseudorandom generator G q with the leakage function L. Let finally A be an algorithm that takes the plaintexts x q = [x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x q ] and leakages l q as input and returns a bit. We consider:
The ind-advantage of A against P q is defined as:
The implementation of a PRG is physically indistinguishable if the ind-advantage of any polynomial time adversary against this implementation is negligible.
We observe that, contrary to the definitions of Dziembowski and Pietrzak [10, 30] , our definition is not adaptive in the sense that the leakage function is the same in each of the q iterations of the PRG. We believe that this definition is realistic since the information leaked is essentially a function of the targeted device rather than a choice of the adversary. Besides, letting the adversary select different leakage functions for different runs of the circuit results in an overly strong definition in many cases, as we will further discuss in Sections 5.1, 6.4.
Physical assumptions: local vs. global approach
Since the apparition of power analysis attacks in the late 1990s, various solutions have been proposed to counteract them. Among these countermeasures, a first category aims to provide design guidelines for the implementation of cryptographic primitives. That is, they study how to implement (e.g.) a block cipher is in such a way that it leaks as little as possible. Such local countermeasures have been intensively analyzed in the last ten years and typically include hiding [42] or masking [16] . Their limitation is that up to now, no solution allows to completely get rid of the leakages. For example, masking schemes have been shown vulnerable to higher order attacks [28] and hiding countermeasures generally give rise to small data dependent leakages that can be exploited by an adversary. As a consequence, a complementary approach is to accept that cryptographic implementations leak a certain amount of information and try to use them in such a way that these leakages do not lead to complete security failures. In this global approach, one essentially assumes that a single iteration of the target cryptographic primitive "does not leak too much", e.g. as in [29, 30] .
In the following of this paper, we investigate this second option. It implies the need to define what is meant by "bounded leakage". For this purpose, the proofs in [30] assume a leakage of λ bits on a key K if this key is (computationally) indistinguishable from a distribution Y having an average min entropy conditioned on the leakage of n−λ bits. This is formalized by the notion of HILL pseudoentropy. Here, we denote with
taken over all circuits D of size s. We finally use the standard definitions: Definition 3. The min entropy of a random variable K is defined as:
and the average min entropy of K conditioned on L is defined as:
Then, we define the following computational analogues:
In practice, we need to evaluate λ for each specific circuit, using realistic measurement equipment. As already mentioned, this amount of leakage highly depends on the target device and adversarial strategy. Leakage traces can be made of gigabytes of data and the selection of a good decoding algorithm to extract λ bits of information is a quite challenging issue. As for classical cryptanalysis concerns, this is where reasonable assumptions have to be introduced in accordance with practical works in the area of side-channel attacks. We show in this section that the framework of [37] can be used for this purpose. Without entering into details that are out of the scope of this paper, the goal of this framework is to provide tools allowing one to evaluate a leaking implementation and a side-channel adversary. As summarized in Figure 4 , it can be seen as an interface between practical and theoretical concerns raised by physically observable devices. When designing new attacks or local countermeasures, it allows determining their effectiveness with a combination of information theoretic and security metrics. For example, it is shown in [38] that an information theoretic metric nicely captures the effectiveness of a local countermeasure such as masking. When building new cryptographic primitives or global countermeasures, it provides reasonable assumptions to prove or argue about their security. For example, we now discuss the extent to which a success rate can be used to approximate the λ-bit leakage required in the security proofs of leakage resilient constructions such as [10, 30] . Literally, a min entropy H ∞ (X) is the negative logarithm of the probability that X is determined correctly with only one guess of the form "is X equal to x?" with an optimal strategy [7] . It directly follows that it is comparable to the success rate of [37] (briefly recalled in Appendix A) as long as the side-channel adversary follows an optimal strategy. When single query attacks are considered, this is straightforward: the adversary just has to guess the most likely key. When multiple queries are allowed, it additionally implies that the adversary has to select his queries adaptively, in the best (i.e. optimal) manner. Since the success rate of a side-channel adversary can be easily measured in practice, we believe it is a reasonable starting point to evaluate λ and consider:
Assumption. The HILL pseudoentropy remaining after a q-query side-channel key recovery attack has been performed against a key variable K is approximated by m, q) ). Practical values for λ in different contexts will be discussed in the next section. We mention that the main issue in this assumption is to apply an optimal strategy in practice. For example, most present side-channel attacks work in a non adaptive fashion. But adapting the formal solutions of [25] to practical environments (this mainly requires to add noise issues in the analysis) has the potential to improve the attacks. In other words, there is a possible gap between the λ-bit leakage assumed in the proofs and the λ-bit leakage approximated in practice. Solutions to reduce this gap are twofold. On the one hand, the approximations of λ should exploit the "best available" adversaries. They should also consider reasonable security margins, as in the practical security approach when designing block ciphers, e.g. in [21] . On the other hand, proofs could be based on a less demanding notion than HILL pseudoentropy. For example, one could try to assume the unpredictability entropy of [31] (that is implied by HILL pseudoentropy):
Note finally that the parameters τ and m correspond to the circuit size s in our definitions of computational entropy. They allow considering the effectiveness of techniques combining side-channel leakages with classical cryptanalysis such as the collision or algebraic side-channel attacks introduced in [31] and [35] .
Analogy with classical cryptanalysis. Before moving to the security analysis of different PRGs, we emphasize again that local and global countermeasures are not contradictory and usually have to be combined. This situation is analogical to classical cryptanalysis. For example, one can design block ciphers following the wide trail strategy [9] and then prove the security of an encryption mode assuming that this block cipher is indistinguishable from a pseudorandom permutation, e.g. as in [4] . Similarly, countermeasures such as masking and hiding (or more formal solutions like [8, 19] ) can be used to design implementations with limited leakages that can then be used in secure PRG constructions.
Leakage resilient PRGs
On the difficulty of modeling a leakage function
An appealing solution to build arbitrary length PRGs secure against side-channel attacks is to consider forward secure primitives, e.g. such as introduced in [5] for symmetric encryption.
In this section, we analyze the "future computation attack" to illustrate the need of a new type of construction in [30] . Such attack can be easily explained from Figure 5 in which a length doubling PRG is denoted as 2PRG and the n states corresponding to n iterations of the arbitrary length PRG are denoted as S i . In [30] , the leakage of each iteration of the 2PRG is bounded to λ bits. As discussed in the previous section, this is a reasonable abstraction. But the λ bits leaked by the computation of a state S i can be selected adaptively by the adversary, as long as they are a polynomial time function of this state. Therefore, a straightforward attack depicted on the figure is to select λ bits of S n during the computation of S 1 , another λ bits of S n during the computation of S 2 , . . . until the state S n is completely revealed which trivially (and completely) breaks the security of the scheme. Looking at the physical reality, this attack is obviously an overestimation of what a sidechannel adversary could achieve. In general, the leakage function is not selected by the adversary, at least not arbitrarily. It is rather a feature of the target device. In certain settings (e.g. electromagnetic leakages), one could imagine that the antenna is moved adaptively during the attack. But it at least remains that a leakage function does never leak about future computations. In reaction to this type of (unrealistic) attacks, three different positions could be adopted:
1. One can consider stronger assumptions for the 2PRG. For example, in the ideal cipher model, the outputs of any iteration of the PRG are uniformly random and the computation of a state S i cannot leak about any state S j with j > i. This is typically the solution considered in [29] . 2. Another solution is to keep the model as it is (i.e. unrealistic with respect to the physics) and to build constructions that can even cope with this type of leakage. This is typically the solution considered in [30] .
3. Eventually, a more elegant solution is to restrict the leakage function in a meaningful way. A natural direction with this respect would be to limit the complexity of this function (e.g. in terms of circuit size).
The goal of the next section is to analyze the models, assumptions and security of different PRGs against side-channel attacks. For simplicity, we selected the forward secure PRG from [5] and the leakage resilient PRG from [30] of which three rounds are pictured in Figure 6 . We note that the block cipher based PRG from [29] could be similarly investigated (i.e. it has essentially the same properties as [5] in terms of resistance against side-channel attacks). Following these papers, we aim to work out the question: "is the alternating structure of [30] a requirement for leakage resilient PRGs or is a forward secure primitive such as [5, 29] sufficient to withstand side-channel attacks?".
We note that (as will be detailed below) both constructions assume in some sense that each state S i only depends on its current inputs and is independent of the previous states. For example, having a shift register containing k 0 and running in parallel to these constructions would break this assumption. 
Theoretical security analysis and limitations
We start with an intuitive description of the two approaches.
Alternating structure. As previously mentioned, a central difficulty when modeling a leakage function is the fact that polynomial time computations from a state S i may potentially leak information about future states S j with j > i. The solution proposed in [30] may be summarized as follows:
1. Double the key size and use an "alternating structure" such as in the lower part of Figure 6 in which wPRF is a weak pseudorandom function (i.e. a PRF in which the inputs are not chosen by the adversary but at random).
2. Assume that when computing the odd states (i.e. S 1 , S 3 , . . .), the even states (i.e. S 2 , S 4 , . . .) are not manipulated by the device and therefore do not leak.
As a result, the sequence of keys k 0 , k 2 , k 4 , . . . cannot be determined from the sequence k 1 , k 3 , k 5 , . . . It implies that, e.g. when leaking λ bits about S 1 , the states S i for any i > 1 are not polynomial time computable from S 1 because k 1 is still safe. This prevents the future computation attack. The main limitation of this proposal is that it is not clear if the alternating structure is only motivated by the proof technique (i.e. the willing to be in the standard model) or if there is also a physical concern that makes it necessary. Its main advantage is the security analysis combining physical and classical security notions (whereas, e.g.
[29] was dealing with both issues separately, in a more specific scenario).
Forward secure PRGs. A more direct way to prevent side-channel attacks is to rely on a forward secure primitive without alternating structure. But if no additional restrictions are considered for the leakage function (and 2PRG, see Section 7.1), proving the security against the future computation attack then requires the assumption that the 2PRGs in the construction of Figure 6 behave as random oracles that the leakage function cannot query. Interestingly, the leakage resilience is quite simple to prove in this context (see Appendix B).
The main security features of these two approaches are listed in Table 1 . In summary, we have an efficient construction that requires strong black box assumptions on the one hand. And on the other hand, we have a less efficient construction proven in the standard model. It is worth to emphasize that the random oracle is only used to prove the leakage resilience of [5] . Yet, in the black box setting this construction remains secure in the standard model. In other words, the random oracle essentially prevents the "future computation attack" while keeping the proofs extremely simple, which seems a reasonable abstraction.
Forward secure PRG [5, 29] Alternating structure [30] It is important to observe that only the construction with the alternating structure requires the assumption that only computation leaks. By contrast, the proof in the random oracle model allows tolerating any (computational or not) leakage. This can become an advantage when moving towards advanced technologies (65 nanometer or smaller) in which the power consumption is not dominated by its dynamic part anymore and static leakages start to play a role (hence breaking the "only computation leaks" assumption). We note that the relaxed assumptions in [30] suffer from similar practical limitations. For example, assuming that the leakages in the two parts of the alternating structure are independent implies certain architectural restrictions for the underlying hardware. At the extreme, it requires to compute these two parts in separate devices. Nevertheless, none of these limitations has the potential to break the construction in practice. In fact, these physical assumptions can be seen as the counterparts that one has to pay in order to get rid of a random oracle in the proofs.
Practical security analysis
The previous section provided an overview of the theoretical security analysis for two PRGs. Given a "'small enough" leakage, these two constructions are expected to be secure against side-channel attacks. In order to observe these results for real devices, it then remains to evaluate exactly how much information is leaked in practice. For this purpose, a first step is to instantiate the 2PRGs and wPRFs that are necessary to implement the leakage resilient PRGs. For illustration and because they are usual targets of practical works in the area of side-channel attacks, we used the block cipher based constructions in Figure 7 , following the suggestion of Pietrzak [30] for his wPRF implementation.
As detailed in Section 4, a reasonable estimation of the leakage in one iteration of a PRG is given by the success rate of the "best available adversary" for which the most important parameter is the data complexity q. A consequence is that the practical security of a construction is mainly determined by the number of different traces that can be exploited to identify each secret key. In other words, the practical security of a construction can be related to the notion of q-limited adversary that has been formalized by Vaudenay in his decorrelation theory [43] . For example, in the context of block ciphers, it yields: Definition 7. An adversary against a block cipher E k (x) is q-limited for a key k if he can only observe the encryption of q different plaintexts under this key.
Following this definition, it is clear that the 2PRG and wPRF of Figure 7 are similar in terms of practical security. For both constructions, one iteration limits the side-channel adversaries to two queries. We can then refine the definition: Of course, having a q-limiting construction is not a sufficient condition to be secure against side-channel attacks. Overall, we need a combination of theoretical security (i.e. the physical indistinguishability discussed in Sections 3 and 5.2) and practical security. But the q-limit allows hardware designers to know how much leakage they need to face. If a construction is 2-limiting, their goal will be to limit the success rate of the best available adversary for q = 2 queries. As an illustration, Table 2 provides the estimated success rates (which can be translated into HILL pseudoentropies using the approximation in Section 4) for different attacks against implementations of the DES and AES Rijndael. They clearly illustrate that small differences in data complexity can lead to largely different success rates. Recall that side-channel attacks can be performed in various contexts (e.g. allowing the profiling of a device or not) which explains this large variance. Unfortunately, there are not a lot of public experiments in which the metrics of [37] have been computed in practice, in particular for protected implementations. But this table already suggests that for small devices (like 8-bit controllers), a reasonable λ-bit leakage can hardly be achieved if no additional (local) countermeasures are considered. For example and when applicable, the 1-limited algebraic side-channel attacks in [32] leak the complete AES master key. An important direction for further research is to extend this list so that for a set of devices, one can reach a reasonable confidence about their resistance against the best known adversaries in terms of success rate, for different complexities. Note finally that it is important to distinguish the data complexity of a sidechannel attack from the number of measurements performed by the adversary. Indeed, for a given data complexity q, the adversary may wish to repeat the measurement of his q different traces several (say n r ) times. For example, the left part of Figure 8 illustrates the impact of measuring the same leakage trace l 1 three different times (giving rise to measurements l 1 , l ′ 1 and l ′′ 1 ). Intuitively, the combination of these measurements can be used to remove the noise from the traces, e.g. in order to obtain a more precise information about an intermediate value Y in the target cryptographic computation. This information can then be translated into information about a subkey S. Here the data complexity is q = 1 and we have n r = 3. By contrast, standard DPA attacks generally try to combine the leakage corresponding to different plaintexts. As illustrated in the right part of Figure 8 , each trace then brings a different information about the target intermediate value Y . And by translating these leakages into subkey information, one can have the intersection between the set of possible subkeys arbitrary small. Here, the data complexity is q = 2 and we have n r = 1.
Following this observation, the expectation when using q-limiting constructions is that even if a polynomial time adversary can remove a significant part of the noise from his side-channel traces (e.g. the ones in Figure 2) , there remains some uncertainty on the key because of the bounded data complexity. At least, one can hope that it is easier for hardware designers to guarantee this condition than to bound the success rate for a non limiting construction. 6 Initialization issues
Breaking [30] with a standard DPA
The claim in [30] is that the alternating structure in Figure 6 can be used as a leakage resilient stream cipher. This implies the need of an initialization process with a public initialization vector. For this purpose, the authors suggest to pick up the keys k 0 and k 1 as well as the public x 0 at random (see the lower part of Figure 6 ). But this is in fact in contradiction with the practical requirements of a stream cipher. It is generally expected that one can re-initialize or re-synchronize a stream cipher without picking up new keys at random (e.g. see [13] ). This is important, e.g. if the stream cipher has to be used in a challenge response protocol. Unfortunately, using x 0 as an initialization vector without changing the keys k 0 and k 1 in the same time leads to straightforward DPA attacks that break the stream cipher of [30] in practice. Just observe that because of the AES based construction in Figure 7 , the adversary targeting the alternating structure for a given x 0 is 2-limited. Say now the adversary re-initializes the PRG with multiple random x 0 values, e.g. say he does it t times with the same key (k 0 , k 1 ). Then, the first iteration of the PRG is not 2-limited anymore but 2 · t-limited, where t can be arbitrarily large. As a consequence, the construction is no more leakage resilient. A standard DPA attack such as in the right part of Figure 8 can be applied. Summarizing, either the alternating structure from [30] is limited to a fixed x 0 and its proof holds -but then, the resulting stream cipher cannot be efficiently re-initialized, re-synchronized, used in a challenge response protocol, . . . Or it allows the adversary to observe multiple x 0 values -but then it is insecure. In other words, there is a component missing in this construction.
Secure initialization process
In order to avoid the previous issue, [29] proposed a secure initialization process of which different variants can be designed. Essentially, the idea is to bound the increase of the q-limit during initialization at the cost of some performance overheads. This can be simply achieved by adding multiplexors in the implementation and using the selection bit(s) to insert the random IV progressively in the PRG iterations. In its original form, pictured in Figure 9 , this process was made of two phases (we refer to the original publication for the details):
1. In a first (initialization) phase, n iterations of the PRG are executed with inputs z i 's that are obtained as follows:
where IV (i) is the i th bit of the initialization vector and C 0 , C 1 are two constants. The n first y i values are not transmitted as output. 2. In a second (generation) phase, the PRG goes on iterating with a fixed input C 0 and now transmits the pseudorandom blocks y i as outputs.
In this basic proposal and if a n-bit IV is considered, the secure initialization requires n iterations of the PRG before pseudorandom blocks can be produced. The advantage of this constructions is that it is still 2-limiting. Trading performances for security is possible by adapting the q-limit and using larger multiplexors (i.e. incorporating more IV bits in each iteration). Applying this idea to the PRGs of [5] and [30] can then be done in different ways. The most straightforward one is to use the IV bits to select which of the 2PRG and wPRF outputs is used as a key in the next round (i.e. if IV (i) = 0, use the lower outputs in Figure 7 , if IV (i) = 1, use the upper one) -again without generating any pseudorandom block during initialization. Adding a multiplexor as in Figure 9 and XORing its output with the plaintexts (or keys) in the PRG constructions of Figure 6 is another solution that also allows various tradeoffs (and may requires a more careful analysis). The next section details yet another simple solution that we only apply to the forward secure PRG of [5] for convenience.
A more elegant (and standard) construction
In fact, the initialization of [29] can be directly related to the construction for pseudorandom functions introduced by Goldreich, Goldwasser and Micali in 1986 [15] . This leads to the simple process represented in Figure 10 . In its simplest form (in the left part of the figure), this construction can be viewed as a binary tree of depth n. The value of the root equals k 0 . Then, depending on the IV bits, the left or right outputs of the 2PRG are selected. After n iterations of the 2PRG, we obtain a key k ′ 0 that has been initialized with a public IV and can be used as a seed in the upper PRG construction of Figure 6 . Again, it is possible to reduce the depth of the tree (i.e. to increase performances) by increasing the q-limit (e.g. the right part of Figure 10 uses 4PRGs with q = 4 and n/2 iterations). In general, it leads to the following tradeoffs:
-Number of iterations for initialization: n/β, -q-limit: 2 β , where β is an integer ∈ [1, n]. anytime the PRG is initialized with the same input, then a "future computation attack" exploiting only the first iteration of the initialization process can be mounted. This can be intuitively related to Figure 8 . In fact, the goal of a secure initialization process is to keep the q-limit as small as possible. Say for illustration that we have a 1-limiting process. Then, the expectation is that repeating the measurement of the same trace l 1 can only be used to remove noise, as in the left part of the figure. Good implementations should be such that this is not sufficient to leak the whole subkey S. But say now the adversary can adaptively choose his leakage function anytime he measures the trace corresponding to the same input plaintext x 1 . Then, DPA attacks can again be mounted as in the right part of the figure. Quite problematically, such attack would imply that any leaking implementation could be broken in linear data complexity.
One solution to prevent the previous issue could be to limit the adaptivity of the leakage function to different inputs. That is, one could require that the same inputs to the target device should always give rise to the same leakage function. But from an operational point of view, the adaptivity of the leakage function relates to the possibility to change the measurement conditions during a side-channel attack (e.g. the antenna's position in an electromagnetic analysis). Hence, whatever modification of the setup that an adversary can do when changing the inputs can also be done when these inputs are kept constant. Therefore, if we assume that the leakage function cannot be chosen adaptively by the adversary when inputs are kept constant (which is mandatory in order to avoid trivial attacks as just described), there is no reason to allow it for variable inputs. We conclude that the leakage function should not be considered as adaptively selected by the adversary. In fact, a better solution to reflect the possible adaptivity of the measurement conditions is to include this adaptivity in the adversary's abilities and to quantify it directly in the λ-bit leakage bound.
From PRFs to PRPs
Following the previous section, it appears that obtaining security against sidechannel attacks may not require new constructions. By simply replacing the IV by an input x, considering k 0 as the secret key k and k ′ 0 as the output y = F k (x), the scheme of Figure 10 can be used as a leakage resilient PRF. As discussed in the previous section, it is q-limiting. Additionally, using similar arguments as for the PRG in Appendix B (see the corollary), it can be proven secure in the random oracle model given that the leakage of the last nPRG iteration (i.e. the one producing the output y) is not provided to the adversary. That is, we can only prove the indistinguishability in the absence of the last round leakage.
Eventually, using the PRF of Figure 10 in the standard Feistel network of Luby and Rackoff [26] , we can build leakage resilient PRPs. Of course, compared to a straightforward use of the AES Rijndael, such constructions imply significant performance drawbacks (i.e. we need a small multiple of n/β AES computations to encrypt one n-bit block with q-limit equal to 2 β ). Yet, it remains that such constructions allow various tradeoffs between security and performances that can be adapted in function of the effectiveness of local countermeasures. Also, they are standard and carefully investigated constructions in cryptography.
7.1 Remark on the impossibility of proving the leakage resilience for the forward secure PRG of [5] in the standard model
We note that restricting the leakage function will not be sufficient to prove the leakage resilience for the forward secure PRG of [5] in the standard model. For example, say the 2PRG used in this construction can be written as:
with G * : {0, 1} n−1 → {0, 1} 2n−1 a secure PRG. Using this 2PRG in the upper scheme of Figure 6 gives rise to a secure PRG in the black box setting. But if the first n bits of G(x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) are used as intermediate key and the second n bits as output, then a simple leakage function that only leaks x 1 will straightforwardly allow breaking the scheme. Importantly, this attack assumes a non adaptive leakage function of which the computational complexity is very low (it just leaks one bit). This counterexample shows that proving the leakage resilience of a PRG such as [5] in the standard model also requires stronger black box assumptions than traditionally considered for length doubling PRGs.
Open problems
This report implies two important scopes for further research. First, we need to determine if resisting against side-channel attacks requires new types of constructions or if forward secure PRGs such as [5] or standard PRFs [15] and PRPs [26] can be sufficient. In other words, is the alternating structure of [30] a necessary condition for leakage resilience or a consequence of an overconservative modeling. This question implies working on the minimum black box assumptions and restrictions of the leakage function to remove unrealistic threats from the analysis (e.g. the future computation attack of Section 5.1 or straightforward attacks as in Section 7.1). Important physical assumptions include:
1. The adaptivity of the leakage function. As discussed in Section 6.4, it is reasonable to remove this ability from the adversary's power and to reflect the possible adaptivity of the measurement setup in the λ-bit leakage bound. 2. "Only computations leak". As discussed in Section 5.2, this assumption should be avoided since it contradicts advanced technologies for integrated circuits where static leakages are no more negligible. 3. The computational limits of the leakage function. In [27, 30] , the leakage function is assumed to be a polynomial time computable function of its inputs. As discussed in Section 5.1, this incorporates attacks that exceed the power of actual adversaries. Hence, an interesting direction would be to further restrict this function. Promising candidates can be found in the early literature on side-channel attacks such as [2] . For example, considering linear functions of a device's internal configuration (or quadratic functions in order to capture possible coupling effects in the circuits) appears as a good starting point. At least, those type of functions should be captured by theoretical analysis, in view of their close connection to practice.
These physical assumptions then have to be combined with minimum black box requirements. We note that considering the black box security and the physical security with different assumptions may be an interesting alternative to demonstrate the leakage resilience while keeping proofs simple. For example, one can show the security of a construction in the standard model without leakage and then use a random oracle (that cannot be queried by the leakage function) to prove side-channel resilience, as in this report. Since the random oracle is then mainly used to capture the idea that "side-channel leakages do not leak about the future", it seems a reasonable abstraction in this context. Second, we need more public experiments that approximate the information leakages in function of the adversary's abilities (i.e. data complexity, time and memory complexity). That is, we need to extend Table 2 in this paper and to compute the metrics of [37] for more algorithms, devices and attacks. This situation can be seen as analogical to the classical cryptanalysis of block ciphers, where it is essential to determine the best known attacks against various ciphers. In a physical setting, the same question arises for every combination of algorithm and device -with the additional difficulty of exactly specifying the adversary's power, e.g. in terms of profiling and a priori knowledge of the underlying hardware. Concentrating the community's experimental efforts on a few implementations (e.g. by standardizing measurement boards) would be very useful in this respect. Initiatives such as [33, 44] could be adapted for this purpose. We note that the large variability of the success rates in Table 2 suggests that keeping λ as small as possible in practical devices is certainly as challenging as properly exploiting small λ's in secure PRG (or other) constructions. Hence, it is essential to keep a balanced treatment between both issues.
Eventually, physical security is a young topic and its proper formalization is still a scope for further research. Hence, it is important to question the validity of the models used to analyze the security of leaking devices first. Because of the physical origin of side-channel (or fault, probing) attacks, it implies the need of experimental evaluations. And the implementation cost also has to be part of this analysis: it is relatively easy to design secure implementations in polynomial size devices -what is difficult is to have a secure smart card of constant size. In this respect, the proliferation of new constructions in non experimented nor fully understood models may not be the best research direction. Overall, what matters to hardware designers is to obtain the best security at the lowest cost. Therefore, it appears natural to use this criteria to guide further research. We mention that it is not clear if the PRG constructions presented in this paper will ever lead to strictly better security than local countermeasures such as masking, hiding, . . . However, they can be used to effectively manage security margins.
A Security metric
We consider a side-channel key recovery adversary A EK ,L with time complexity τ , memory complexity m andueries to the target physical computer. His goal aim is to guess a key class s with non negligible probability. For this purpose and for each candidate s * , he compares the actual observation of a leaking device l q with some key dependent model for these leakages M(s * , .). Let T(l q , M(s * , .)) be the statistical test used in the comparison. We assume that the highest value of the statistic corresponds to the most likely key candidate. For each observation l q , we store the result of the statistical test T in a vector g q = T(l q , M(s * , .)) containing the key candidates sorted according to their likelihood: g q := [g 1 , g 2 , . . . , g |K| ] (e.g. |S|=256 for key bytes). Then, for any side-channel attack exploiting a leakage vector l q and giving rise to a result g q , we define the success function of order o against a key byte s as:
. It leads to the o th -order success rate:
Intuitively, a success rate of order 1 (resp. 2) relates to the probability that the correct key byte is sorted first (resp. among the two first ones) by the adversary.
B Proof of security for the forward secure PRG of [5] Theorem 1. Assume that the 2P RG : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} 2n of [5] behaves like a random oracle, and run it for q iterations, i.e. (k i+1 ,x i+1 ):=2PRG(k i ). Assume also that each iteration (except for the last one) has a constant portion leakage l i which is an arbitrary λ-bit function of k i , i.e. l i :=f i (k i ), |l i |=λ=αn for any constant 0 ≤ α < 1. Then, given l 0 , l 1 , · · · , l q−1 , x 1 , · · · , x q−1 , it is exponentially hard to distinguish x q from uniformly random, and even if k i is exposed, it does not reveal anything about previous keys k j (j < i).
Proof sketch. By definition of a random oracle, on input k i the function 2P RG outputs independent and uniform random k i+1 , x i+1 as long as k i is different from previous keys (the chance of collision is exponentially low). Hence, k 0 , · · · , k q , x 1 , · · · , x q are all uniform and independent of each other, and each l i only depends on k i . It implies that the adversary has to recover each k i using l i independently. As k i is uniform, l i = f i (x i ) assumes at most 2 λ values and for each value, the probability that the adversary can make a successful guess is bounded by the reciprocal of cardinality 1/|{f −1 i (l i )}|. Therefore, the overall success probability is upper bounded by: Since recovering each k i is exponentially hard and there is no leakage on x q , it follows that it is exponential hard to distinguish x q from uniformly random. The forward security is directly due to that inverting a random oracle is not possible.
Corollary 1. Assume 2P RG : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} 2n behaving as a random oracle, construct a PRF using this 2P RG as in [15] , and in turn construct a PRP based on this PRF as in [26] . Then, the security of these constructions using a 2PRG on n-bit inputs with λ = αn bits of leakage in each iteration is equivalent to that using a 2PRG on (1 − α)n-bit inputs in the black box model. Proof sketch. It follows from the above proof that in the random oracle model, k 0 , · · · , k q , x 1 , · · · , x q are all uniform and independent, and that any αn bit leakage merely decreases the effective security parameter from n to (1 − α)n.
